{"id":52338,"date":"2025-12-01T18:23:50","date_gmt":"2025-12-01T15:23:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/memopzk.org\/?post_type=analytics&p=52338"},"modified":"2025-12-10T16:43:34","modified_gmt":"2025-12-10T13:43:34","slug":"fraudsters-from-the-fsb-how-law-enforcement-agencies-fabricate-prosecutions-for-terrorism-and-treason","status":"publish","type":"analytics","link":"https:\/\/memopzk.org\/en\/analytics\/fraudsters-from-the-fsb-how-law-enforcement-agencies-fabricate-prosecutions-for-terrorism-and-treason\/","title":{"rendered":"Fraudsters from the FSB: How law enforcement agencies fabricate prosecutions for terrorism and treason"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The footage is probably shot from a camera on an officer\u2019s helmet. A man jumps out of the front passenger seat of a car, holding what looks like a hammer in his hand. In the headlights or street lighting, his silhouette can be seen against the snow. He runs towards a car parked in front. Someone else runs up to the car from the other side.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Fucking police! Get out of the fucking car!\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Someone is pulled from the back seat of the car, but it is dark in the street and very difficult to see what is happening.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018She fell, for fuck’s sake, she fell!\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A girl, lying in the snow, responds surprisingly calmly, only slightly confused: \u2018I fell down, I fell down.\u2019
The men shout over each other: \u2018She rolled over!\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Get your hands up!\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Hands behind your head, for fuck’s sake!\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The girl is handcuffed.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is how the arrest<\/a> of 20-year-old Valeria Zotova took place. We shall return to her story a little later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

About this report<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Valeria Zotova is just one of the victims of entrapment by Russian law enforcement agencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Russia, entrapment has long been a method used by law enforcement agencies (the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the FSB [Federal Security Service]) or their agents to artificially create the conditions for commission of a crime. Until recently, this method was most often used in high-profile but relatively specific cases, such as the \u2018New Greatness\u2019 [Novoe Velichie] case, as well as in the routine fight against drug trafficking. However, after the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, the practice of entrapment has rapidly expanded beyond these limits, becoming an integral part of the system of politically motivated criminal prosecutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The current report presents an analysis of 33 criminal cases in which there is a very high probability of entrapment. In some cases, the incitement is obvious; in others, there are strong grounds to assume it. To get the full picture, we have analysed indictments, sentences, appeals, victim testimonies and letters from places of imprisonment, as well as publications by media and human rights organisations. Based on this information, we describe how entrapment works in politically motivated criminal cases. Of course, there are significantly more than 33 cases with evidence of entrapment. We have sought to select the most illustrative ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All the cases examined were initiated after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and are directly related to the war. This does not mean we do not record entrapment in other types of politically motivated prosecutions. However, those are far fewer in number and, furthermore, cases of entrapment related to the war against Ukraine have their own distinctive features and need to be considered separately as part of a specific campaign of intimidation against opponents of the Russian invasion. Another characteristic feature of these cases of entrapment is that the vast majority of them were run by the FSB and only a small number by the Main Directorate for Combating Organised Crime of the Russian MVD (Centre \u2018E\u2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In considering this issue, it must be emphasised that the practice of entrapment is not only unethical and immoral, but also directly prohibited by Russian and international law. In accordance with Article 5 of the Federal Law \u2018On Operational-Investigative Activities,\u2019 \u2018bodies (officials) carrying out operational-investigative activities are prohibited from inciting, persuading, or encouraging, directly or indirectly, the commission of unlawful acts (entrapment)<\/em>.\u2019 In violating this norm, law enforcement officers not only exceed their authority, but also create crimes where none existed, undermine trust in the legal system, violate the law, and deprive the accused of their right to a fair trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two stories<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

We begin with the stories of two young women who lived near each other and did not hide their anti-war views. In other regards, they were quite different people and did not know each other. However, at a certain point, events in their lives began to unfold according to a surprisingly similar scenario.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Valeria Zotova lived in Yaroslavl with her mother Svetlana and worked in a warehouse of the Magnit chain store. The two women attracted the attention of law enforcement because they openly disapproved of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and Svetlana also expressed opposition views in general. Before the war, Svetlana would go to the center of Yaroslavl to hold single-person protests. In November 2022, she was fined for \u2018discrediting\u2019 the armed forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In early December 2022, Valeria Zotova began corresponding on WhatsApp with a man who introduced himself as \u2018Andrei,\u2019 an officer of the Ukrainian Security Service [SBU] from Kyiv. According to the investigative authorities, Zotova subscribed to \u2018various pro-Ukrainian groups and chats,\u2019 where \u2018Andrei\u2019 probably found her. According to Svetlana and one of Valeria\u2019s friends, Valeria\u2019s correspondence with \u2018Andrei\u2019 was a mixture of light flirting and discussion of the war situation. On one occasion, \u2018Andrei\u2019 allegedly sent Valeria a bouquet of flowers by courier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Around this time, Valeria Zotova made a new friend who called herself \u2018Karina.\u2019 As it later became known, the girls’ friendship was part of an investigative \u2018experiment\u2019 organised by the FSB. In court, \u2018Karina\u2019 was to act as a secret witness named \u2018Geranium\u2019 and testify against Zotova.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When \u2018Andrei\u2019 suggested Valeria set fire to a rural local government building, promising her $2,000 in payment, \u2018Karina\u2019 supported the idea, found a car with a driver for the purpose and accompanied Zotova in this car until she was arrested. \u2018Karina\u2019 did everything she could to calm Zotova before the trip. \u201cOnly think about the good things. Everything will be fine,\u2019 she wrote to Valeria on VK a few hours before the latter\u2019s arrest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just before the arson was to take place, Zotova changed her mind. She came up with an idea she thought was better: to deceive \u2018Andrei\u2019 by pretending his request had been fulfilled. She decided not to set fire to the building, but instead just take pictures of herself standing in front of the building holding \u2018Molotov cocktails\u2019 and then report back with these photos. This is evidenced by the correspondence between the young women which is available in the case files. However, the court subsequently ignored these facts, which could have served as evidence of Zotova’s innocence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 17 February 2023, Valeria Zotova was arrested in a car outside the offices of the Karabikhskoe village local government in the Yaroslavl municipal district of Yaroslavl region. In the car were gasoline purchased by Zotova, empty bottles, scraps of fabric and a lighter. On 28 June 2023, Zotova was found guilty of attempting to commit a terrorist act and sentenced to six years in a general regime penal colony.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Veronika Netunaeva lived in the city of Uglich in Yaroslavl region and worked as a consultant in the city government\u2019s legal department.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Netunaeva expressed negative views towards the policies of the Russian authorities and the war against Ukraine on her Instagram and Telegram accounts. During April and May 2023, a certain \u2018Yakov\u2019 wrote to her on WhatsApp, saying he had read her Instagram post and then found her phone number through a bot. Netunaeva’s interlocutor said he lived in Kyiv and was a soldier in the Ukrainian army. The phone number used by \u2018Yakov\u2019 had a Ukrainian code.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Yakov\u2019 discussed the war and the situation in Russia with Netunaeva. He probably expressed admiration for her courage and determination. However, when \u2018Yakov\u2019 asked her if she had any acquaintances who would be willing to plant explosives under railway tracks and at the Uglich hydroelectric power station for a reward, Netunaeva replied she had no such acquaintances, there was no point in mining the railway tracks, and it was impossible to mine the hydroelectric power station.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then \u2018Yakov\u2019 began to discuss with Netunaeva a drone attack on the Uglich hydroelectric power station and asked her to provide information to help carry it out. Netunaeva sent photographs and coordinates of the hydroelectric power station, which she had obtained after visiting the hydroelectric power station three times. Her actions during these trips were recorded by FSB officers. Netunaeva refused the reward offered by \u2018Yakov.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Netunaeva stated at her trial, she suspected she was a victim of entrapment, but she was not sure and wanted to find out. According to her, the information she sent \u2018Yakov\u2019 was of no use and was publicly available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Veronika Netunaeva was arrested on 14 July 2023 at her place of work. The arrest took place<\/a> in a less brutal manner than in the case of Zotova.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 13 February 2024, Veronika Netunaeva was found guilty of aiding and abetting preparation of a terrorist act and sentenced to six years in a general regime penal colony.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

These two stories have a great deal in common. Both women lived in Yaroslavl region and expressed anti-war views on social media. In both cases an unknown person contacted them via WhatsApp, introducing himself in one case as a Ukrainian soldier and in the other as an officer of the Ukrainian Security Service [SBU]. At first, their interlocutors talked about war and politics, then asked for help in carrying out an attack on a certain target. Both women were under surveillance and detained before the \u2018terrorist attack\u2019 was carried out. In both cases, the investigation was conducted by the Yaroslavl branch of the FSB. Both indictments were signed by A. D. Popov, senior investigator of the FSB’s Yaroslavl branch. Zotova was charged with attempting to commit a terrorist act, and Netunaeva with preparing to commit a terrorist act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, the most surprising similarity is that the materials of both criminal cases refer to a telephone number to which the accounts of \u2018Andrei\u2019 and \u2018Iakov\u2019 were linked. It is the same number: +380 66 233 57 39. The media outlet Mediazona<\/em>, which wrote<\/a> about the Zotova case, tried to find the owner of the telephone number: \u2018This number is registered to Lidiya Mikolaevna Kuznetsova, while on VKontakte it is linked to the account of a user with a different name \u2014 Olga Knyazeva, whose page has not been updated since the summer of 2018. Judging from her profile, Knyazeva sold shoes and clothing in Donetsk. The list of pages she followed includes local groups, a group with recipes, and a pro-Russian page with news from Makiivka. <\/em>Mediazona was unable to find any other information related to this number.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It turns out it was the same people who communicated with both women. Possibly it was one person who specialised in a \u2018female audience.\u2019 In both cases, neither the investigative authorities nor the court attempted to find out who owned this telephone number. These cases (like most of the others discussed in this report) are described in more detail in our related publications (Valeria Zotova<\/strong><\/a>, Veronika Netunaeva<\/strong><\/a>), where you can also find more information about why these cases were most likely examples of entrapment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is difficult to say for certain why the security forces did not use a new SIM card in each new case. Perhaps the Yaroslavl FSB had a limited number of Ukrainian SIM cards in 2022-23. But probably the main reason was that there was no need to do so. Court decisions in such cases are predetermined, and such \u2018trifles,\u2019 even if they were to become known, would have no influence on them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At present, the database of the project \u2018Political Prisoners. Memorial\u2019 contains information about 15 prosecutions on charges under Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation [CC RF] (\u2019Terrorist Act\u2018) in Yaroslavl region which show signs of political motivation. In all 15 cases, the defendants were arrested before the \u2018terrorist acts\u2019 were carried out. In three cases, we found signs of entrapment and have recognised those convicted as political prisoners. In addition to the cases of Zotova and Netunaeva, this includes that of Denis Popov<\/a>, a resident of the same town of Uglich who was going to set fire to a military enlistment office after communicating with an operative who used the pseudonym \u2018Anriiko.\u2019 The remaining 12 cases are those that we have either not yet fully investigated or ones where as yet we have insufficient evidence. How many of them also involved entrapment by the law enforcement agencies? Or perhaps it would be more accurate to ask: are there any cases where there was no entrapment?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stages of Entrapment<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

We examine cases involving entrapment in the order of the stages in which they unfold, starting with the search for a victim and ending with the trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stage 1. The most opaque. The search for a victim<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Where do the security forces look?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In informal groups<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

It all starts with choosing a victim. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it was common practice for law enforcement agencies to identify informal groups that aroused their suspicion, after which an agent would be infiltrated into the group to carry out the entrapment. This scenario was followed, for example, in the aforementioned cases of New Greatness<\/a> and of the Marxist circle in Ufa<\/a>. Such cases have continued even after the start of the full-scale invasion. For example, FSB officers found Nikolai Yuryev<\/a>, a chef from Novouralsk in Sverdlovsk region, at a meeting of supporters of the Citizens of the USSR movement and Evgeny Mishchenko<\/a> among volunteers at the so-called Nemtsov Bridge in Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anti-war statements on the internet<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

However, since the start of the full-scale war, this scenario of searching for victims has become something of an exception. The scale of political repression has increased dramatically, entrapment has become much more common, and this method of finding a victim has been seen as too labour-intensive. Moreover, opponents of the war are not generally united in any groups. The main place to search for potential victims is the internet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In many cases, there are grounds to argue that it was publications on the internet, primarily on social media, that attracted the interest of law enforcement to future defendants in criminal cases. Of the 33 cases we consider in this report, it is likely that in at least nine cases events unfolded in line with this scenario. In these cases it had no significance on which social media site or internet resource the statements were made. When contacting Veronika Netunaeva, the \u2018Ukrainian soldiers\u2019 referred to her posts on Instagram. The soldier Anton Khozhaev<\/a> had left comments on the Telegram chat Journalists from Ukraine<\/em> in which he spoke of his desire to travel to Ukraine. Aleksei Giletin<\/a>, a resident of Murmansk born in Luhansk, expressed his anti-war views on VK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Searching for information about the Free Russia Legion on the internet<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

A large number of instances of entrapment have been linked to the Free Russia Legion (FRL), a unit of the Ukrainian army. The FRL is mentioned in approximately half of the cases we examine in this report. Media and human rights organisations have repeatedly written about entrapment by Russian intelligence agencies related to the FRL. Russian intelligence agencies have deployed a wide network of fake internet resources, which they use in an effort to identify citizens with pro-Ukrainian views interested in the activities of the FRL.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In May 2023, the SOTA project<\/a> studied numerous fake Telegram bots allegedly linked to the FRL and the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC). The bots position themselves as official resources of these organisations and collect personal information about applicants to join them: passport details, military ID numbers, places of residence and work, national pension insurance number and taxpayer ID number. At that time, there were about ten fake bots claiming to be related to the FRL. They required candidates to fill out a questionnaire and provide information about themselves before contacting a recruiter. Investigative journalists entered into correspondence with these accounts, sent them completed questionnaires with an IP logger (a programme that records the IP address from which the document was opened) and found that the accounts were managed from St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg or via an American VPN. At the same time, the FRL told the SOTA project that it only has one chatbot on Telegram, and that does not collect personal data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The human rights project First Department<\/a> reported that, in August 2024, civic activists and programmers Aleksandr Litreev and Artem Tamoyan had spoken<\/a> about a phishing campaign targeting anti-war Russians. Clone sites of the FRL and the RVC collected data on people who had attempted to contact these formations. Yandex showed both of these fake websites at the top of its search results. According to Tamoyan, the only explanation for this behaviour by the search engine is that it was manually configured by Yandex employees. The information collected through the fake websites was then used as the basis for criminal prosecutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The scenario in which a pro-Ukrainian Russian believes they are communicating with the FRL, fills out a questionnaire, sends personal data, performs certain tasks (from putting up posters to preparing to set fire to a military enlistment office), makes plans to leave Russia to join the FRL, and as a result is detained, while all their communication with the \u2018FRL\u2019 was in fact with the FSB, is probably the most common scenario in the cases considered in this report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interception of correspondence in Telegram<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Another possible means to find a victim is to intercept messages in Telegram. Journalists and human rights activists have repeatedly suggested that correspondence with bots on Ukrainian channels may be accessible to Russian intelligence agencies. The media outlet Vazhnye Istorii<\/em> (Important Stories) has written about<\/a> this issue and First Department has directly confirmed<\/a> the practice. While we cannot unequivocally confirm this based on an analysis of the cases at our disposal, it seems likely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Calls to Ukraine<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Attempts to contact Ukrainian organisations by telephone are unsafe. Calls to certain numbers are likely to be recorded by Russian intelligence agencies, and Russians who make them are subject to operational surveillance. As in the case of internet resources, the use of fake telephone numbers cannot be ruled out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the indictment in the case of 20-year-old Kazan resident Mikhail Balabanov<\/a>, this is how the defendant described his attempt to contact the Ukrainian \u2018I Want to Live\u2019 project: \u2018Around the end of November 2022, he was watching a video on YouTube linked to the Ukrainian side, which talked about Russian prisoners of war and how surrendering could help avoid participating in the war, and there was a foreign phone number starting with +380, but he doesn’t remember the full number. Since he was afraid that he might be mobilised and sent to fight in a war with which he wholeheartedly disagreed, he called the number, but no one answered. Later that evening, a user named \u2018I Want to Live\u2019 wrote to him on Telegram, but there was no phone number in that account. The user \u2018I Want to Live\u2019 asked Balabanov if he wanted to surrender, to which he replied that he was against the war and did not want to be mobilised. He gave his personal details, expressed his negative views about the war and told his interlocutor he wanted to leave Russia. The user \u2018I Want to Live\u2019 told him he could help him leave Russia, but that in return for help, he would also have to assist them. He agreed, after which the user \u2018I Want to Live\u2019 introduced himself as an officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and said that his name was \u201cBen\u201d<\/em>.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In September 2022, 21-year-old Daniil Zinkovsky<\/a>, according to the verdict, called a telephone number allegedly \u2018used as a contact number for persons wishing to join the International Legion for the Territorial Defence of Ukraine, and informed them of his intention to join one of the Ukrainian armed formations to participate in hostilities against the armed forces of the Russian Federation.\u2019<\/em> Following instructions he then received, Zinkovsky, \u2018travelling in the direction of Ukraine,\u2019 left the village of Leningradskaya in Krasnodar region, where he lived, for Rostov region, where he was detained. According to the verdict, all his actions were under the surveillance of Krasnodar region FSB officers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ways to carry out entrapment<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Online<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

As with finding victims, most entrapments are now carried out online. Law enforcement officers begin communicating with potential victims on the internet, and all further communication takes place there. The victim carries out various tasks, which law enforcement subsequently use as evidence against them in court. When the law enforcement officers consider enough has been done, or in other cases, as for example if a victim stops following their instructions, an arrest is made. In more than half the cases we examined, events unfolded in line with this scenario. A telling example of this practice is the case of Veronika Netunaeva described above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Agents provocateurs<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

However, there continue to be instances of entrapment carried out with the help of agents provocateurs<\/em>. The cases of Yuryev and Mishchenko have already been mentioned. Nikolai Yuryev<\/a> met the agents provocateurs<\/em> at a meeting of the Citizens of the USSR movement. A supposed like-minded volunteer and fellow member of the Nemtsov Bridge movement gained the trust of volunteer Evgeny Mishchenko<\/a>. His new acquaintance turned out to be an agent provocateur<\/em> used by the police anti-extremism department, Centre E. Polina Evtushenko<\/a> went on friendly dates with a young man who started conversations with her about the war and recorded them on a dictaphone. However, these examples and most other similar offline entrapments relate to the years 2022\u20132023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Those acting as agents provocateurs<\/em> are often individuals with legal problems or a criminal past. As it later transpired, Polina Evtushenko had been dating Nikolai Komarov, who had previously been convicted of theft. Ilya Baburin<\/a> was offered help in setting fire to a military enlistment office by a secret witness, \u2018Dmitry Shorin,\u2019 a person who was apparently at that time himself being criminally prosecuted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The case of Aleksandr Fomenko<\/a> involved Aleksandr Demyanenko, a previously convicted criminal who \u2018accidentally\u2019 served a short-term jail sentence for an administrative-law offence together with Fomenko. The men met, continued to communicate after their arrest, drank together, talked about the war, and wrote letters to the FRL. Demyanenko then testified against Fomenko in court. Later, when a large quantity of drugs was found in Demyanenko’s possession, the investigative authorities and the court treated him leniently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mixed option<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Finally, there are cases in which both agents provocateurs<\/em> and online correspondence are involved. One such case, that of Valeria Zotova, has already been described above. In this context, the case of Gagik Grigoryan<\/a>, a high school student from Kursk region, should be mentioned. During a lecture that was part of a preparatory course for going to university, a girl who claimed to be the same age as Grigoryan introduced herself to him. While she looked much older, she explained this was because of a rare genetic disease. They continued to keep in touch and the girl would start conversations about the war, politics, disagreement with the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and the need for the war to stop. Later, this girl acted as a witness, \u2018Shmykova,\u2019 in Grigoryan\u2019s prosecution, giving testimony during the preliminary investigation that Grigoryan intended to commit a terrorist act and had urged her to do the same. At the same time, Grigoryan was chatting on a messenger service with unknown individuals who, according to the investigative authorities, told Grigoryan they were officers of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Again, according to the investigative authorities, the \u2018officers of the Main Intelligence Directorate\u2019 wanted Grigoryan to carry out a terrorist attack and blow up a Russian serviceman. We return to the case of Gagik Grigoryan below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stage 2. The decisive moment. Establishing contact and obtaining agreement to cooperate<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Once a potential victim has been selected, a critical moment arrives: having established contact, consent needs to be obtained to \u2018cooperate.\u2019 In some cases, the person may be ready to act almost immediately, but often law enforcement needs to use various methods of persuasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instruments of Pressure: how law enforcement uses war, money and fear<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Anti-war, pro-Ukrainian sentiments<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

It all begins with conversations on anti-war topics, politics, and the Russian invasion. Law enforcement uses concerns related to the war to exert pressure and propose the individuals help Ukraine repel Russian aggression. This is exactly how, for example, conversations with school student Gagik Grigoryan were conducted. In the case of Nikolai Yuryev, law enforcement officers convinced him he could save Russian boys from mobilisation and death if he set fire to a military enlistment office.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For some of those targeted, this proves sufficient. However, in other cases, for example when the victim is unsure whether to carry out a task, other proposals may follow, taking into account the specifics of the individual’s situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assistance with emigration<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

If the victim is looking for opportunities to emigrate from Russia, a promise to help them leave is made. This is what happened, for example, in the cases of Anton Galeta<\/a> and Mikhail Balabanov<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Money<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Law enforcement agencies readily offer and pay money. Money may be offered even in situations where it is not the main motive. For example, money was offered to Veronika Netunaeva, but she refused. Money is probably also offered with the aim of discrediting the targets, so that they can later be portrayed as venal and acting out of self-interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Money is paid for the completion of specific tasks, as compensation for expenses related to assignments from the \u2018SBU,\u2019 and for the purchase of items that are subsequently used as evidence. Payments are usually transferred to the victims’ bank cards. At the same time, during the investigation and trial, the obvious need to follow the financial trail leading to the identity of the person who paid the money is systematically ignored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The SBU intimidates Ukrainians<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Threats allegedly coming from the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) are often used to persuade residents of the occupied territories. \u2018Representatives of the SBU\u2019 insist on cooperation, threatening that if the targeted individual refuses to cooperate, their relatives living in Ukraine will face serious problems. This is what happened, for example, to Valentina Tagirova<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Valentina Tagirova is a citizen of Ukraine who obtained Russian citizenship in 2021. Until 2022 she lived in Makiivka, in Ukraine\u2019s Donetsk region, when she was evacuated to Samara in February 2022. In Samara, she lived in a temporary accommodation centre with other people from Ukraine. Tagirova told Kholod<\/em><\/a> that in February 2023 she received a message on Telegram from an unknown person whose name and phone number were hidden. The person introduced themselves as \u2018an employee of the SBU and said I needed to cooperate, as they knew where I was now, that I was in Samara with my daughter, that my father lived in Donetsk, and that if I refused, they would do bad things to my father […]. He knew everything about me: who I was, who my relatives were and where they lived, where my daughter and I were. I didn’t understand how they knew all this […]. He told me to photograph some objects, and then suggested I buy items needed to start a fire and leave them in an agreed place \u2014 supposedly he would pick them up later and start the fire. I refused, but he began threatening me, saying if I wanted my loved ones to stay alive and well, I had to do what he said. I was scared. I thought that if I followed his instructions, it would all be over.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

And even more cynicism<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In the case of Konstantin Gladkov<\/a>, law enforcement took advantage of the desperation of a man searching for a relative missing in the war. Gladkov’s nephew, who had been mobilised, went missing. Konstantin Gladkov and his relatives tried to find him, contacting various Russian and then Ukrainian authorities. It was probably these searches that attracted the attention of the security forces. This is how Gladkov describes the subsequent events: \u2018Around December 2023, he received a call on his phone. The caller introduced himself as Fyodor and explained he was a representative of […] a charitable foundation. He said that Maksim, his nephew, was a prisoner of war, that he had been wounded and needed to be hospitalised, and that 10,000,000 roubles was needed to transport him, as the foundation did not currently have such funds because of the large number of requests. Konstantin Gladkov explained that his family did not have that kind of money, to which Fyodor asked him to do him a favour, namely to make metal brackets and mix saltpetre with aluminium powder.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Victims of entrapment<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A wide range of people become victims of entrapment, but some groups are more at risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First and foremost, these are very young people. Of the 33 cases we examine in this report, 11 of the defendants were no older than 21 at the time of entrapment. Young people are more impulsive and trusting, and the security forces are happy to take advantage of this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Secondly, many victims of entrapment are described by their acquaintances as naive and guileless, or even as being borderline in terms of their mental health. On account of various circumstances in their lives and personal characteristics, such people are more vulnerable to the actions of security forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Former lawyer Magomedgadzhi Rabadanov<\/a> was 69 years old at the time of his arrest. He had lost a court case with his ex-wife and two sons over living space in a communal apartment and tried various ways to get the decision reviewed. His ex-wife argued that his behaviour was at times strange, characterised by obsessive ideas. He was examined by a psychiatrist, but no diagnosis was confirmed. In his search for justice, Rabadanov became desperate. Perhaps at some point he decided that the Ukrainian authorities could help him, something the FSB officers took advantage of. Rabadanov himself explained the ensuing criminal prosecution as the actions of a gang of \u2018criminals from law enforcement agencies, the courts and persons living in his communal apartment, including his ex-wife and children, with the aim of taking possession of his two rooms<\/em>\u2019 – something which also confirms doubts about his perception of reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the case of Valeria Zotova, a forensic medical examination revealed \u2018an emotionally unstable personality disorder<\/em>.\u2019 People with this diagnosis tend to \u2018act impulsively, without considering the consequences of their actions<\/em>,\u2019 and exhibit \u2018emotional instability, irritability, quick temper, and a lack of critical assessment of their condition and behaviour.<\/em>\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Law enforcement agencies do not shy away from using entrapment against people with obvious mental health problems. A glaring example is the case of Aleksandr Matkheev.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Aleksandr Matkheev lived in the village of Osa in the Ust-Ordynsky Buryat district of Irkutsk region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Matkheev was registered at a psychiatric clinic and had mild mental retardation. This diagnosis was later confirmed by a psychiatric forensic examination appointed by the investigative authorities. Aleksandr\u2019s sister called<\/a> him \u2018a child in an adult’s body\u2019 and noted his naivety and suggestibility. \u2018He is calm, slow, very measured, friendly, very easy-going,\u2019 she said, describing her brother’s character. \u2018He was raised, let’s say, mostly by women, his grandmother and mother.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was difficult for Matkheev to find a permanent job. He could not obtain a driving licence and work as a driver, nor could he work for a security company because of his diagnosis and registration with the local psychiatric hospital. For that reason, Matkheev took on various temporary jobs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In January 2023, Matheev made a new acquaintance on the VK social media site, with whom he discussed joining the FRL. At that time, Matkheev posted Ukrainian symbols on VK, including the flags of Ukraine and the FRL. He discussed joining the FRL with several other people online, but it is unclear whether they were all connected to the security services. However, it is obvious that at some point officers of the Kemerovo FSB began corresponding with him. They asked him to fill out a questionnaire, shoot several videos, and buy a set of items (see below). After that, the Kemerovo FSB officers, probably not wanting to hand over the case they had \u2018uncovered\u2019 to their colleagues or to travel to Irkutsk region, told Matkheev to buy a ticket to the Taiga station in Kemerovo region. There, he was to be met by a representative of the FRL and escorted to Kazakhstan. On 14 November 2023, Matkheev was arrested at the station in Taiga. Later, a video<\/a> of Matkheev\u2019s arrest was posted in which Matkheev, clearly frightened, does not scream or moan, but rather whimpers in pain and for a long time cannot find the words to answer the law enforcement officer\u2019s questions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During his time on remand, the trusting and impressionable Matkheev completely revised his views and began to support the war. This is an excerpt from a letter he wrote to his mother: \u2018Mum, I won’t let you down. I will listen to everyone. And I won’t let down the FSB and FSIN officers. And I don’t want to let anyone down. [<\/em>\ufeff\u2026<\/em>\ufeff] And don’t worry, Mum. I’ll come back to you. You’ll be proud of me. Mum, I’ll be a hero. And I love my homeland. I love my Russia.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 24 April 2024, Aleksandr Matkheev was sentenced to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment, the first three years of which he is to spend in a cell-type prison.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Names and nicknames of law enforcement officers<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Russian law enforcement officers and the agents provocateurs<\/em> collaborating with them disproportionately use rare names and strange nicknames. It is difficult to say whether this is a manifestation of a peculiar sense of humour or whether, in their opinion, unusual names and pseudonyms are intended to inspire greater trust in their victims or to weed out people of a more critical nature. For example, the following names and nicknames were encountered in the cases reviewed in this report: Yakov, Vugar Ibragimov, Ben, Lana, Platon, Shoroh, LoVeRs, Channel 1, Curator, Crimea Coordinator, RF Coordinator, Zdravko Pugi, Nadezhny (Reliable), Rex, Abrams Leopardovich.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consent \u2014 the point of no return<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The moment law enforcement officers establish contact with a victim and obtain some form of consent to cooperate is probably the key moment. For law enforcement, consent to cooperate is a kind of Rubicon after which there is no turning back. It does not matter if there is a degree of ambiguity in this consent, it does not matter whether the suspect will do something other than that intended or even completely abandon their plans, it does not matter whether law enforcement officers have other evidence of a victim’s \u2018criminal\u2019 intentions and actions. The person targeted will not be left alone and, one way or another, the case will end up in court. A telling example is the case of Artem Basyrov.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Artyom Basyrov is a resident of Kemerovo who studied at a technical college. According to the investigative authorities, in April 2022 Basyrov contacted a representative of the FRL on Telegram who went by the nickname \u2018Oleg.\u2019 \u2018Oleg\u2019 instructed him that to join the FRL he needed to obtain a passport for foreign travel, go to Georgia, contact the Ukrainian embassy there and receive further instructions. On 5 April 2022, Basyrov applied for a passport, which he received on 22 April. \u2018Oleg\u2019 also sent Basyrov an application form to join the FRL. However, Basyrov neither filled out the form nor sent it. He took no further action. In his later testimony, he explained that he had abandoned his plans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The FSB officers waited two weeks, probably trying to push Basyrov into acting. Apparently realising he was not going to do anything, on 5 May 2022 law enforcement officers went to his home. However, Basyrov was at college at the time. His mother told the officers that her son was at the college and they went there to pick him up. His mother then called Artyom and told him about the visit from the law enforcement officers. Basyrov asked her to remove the hard drive from his computer and throw it away, which she did. Basyrov was then questioned by officers from the Kemerovo FSB. It is likely that during this interrogation (referred to in the verdict as \u2018Questioning\u2019), Basyrov testified against himself. However, apart from Basyrov’s testimony, the FSB had no evidence, something which at that time law enforcement apparently considered insufficient to take the case further.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Basyrov was not detained. The FSB continued to search for other evidence of his guilt. For three months after the security forces visited Basyrov’s home, FSB officers carried out various operational measures against him. Basyrov’s conversations with acquaintances were recorded, and operational search measures were carried out, including \u2018Questioning,\u2019 \u2018Checking References,\u2019 \u2018Inspection of premises, buildings, structures, local areas and vehicles,\u2019 \u2018Operational experiment,\u2019 and \u2018Collection of samples for comparative study.\u2019 Basyrov was also formally confronted with his acquaintances, his personal belongings were examined, and a political science expert studied the tattoos on his body. Despite such active work by the Kemerovo FSB, no significant evidence was obtained in the course of these actions, and the case continued to be based mainly on Basyrov’s testimony.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, law enforcement did not close the case. Despite the fact that Basyrov remained at liberty all this time and did not try to hide, he was detained on 11 August 2022. In December 2022, Basyrov was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2025, a new criminal charge was brought against Basyrov and, a few months before the end of his first sentence, he was convicted of several \u2018terrorism\u2019 offences. The details of his new sentence are not known.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Telegram, but not only<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

There is a widespread belief that Russian intelligence agencies use Telegram almost exclusively for purposes of entrapment. Indeed, in most cases, Russian law enforcement pretended to be \u2018Ukrainian curators\u2019 in this particular messenger. However, as can be seen from the examples given, WhatsApp has also often been used.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other communication channels may, however, also be used. For example, in the case of the entrapment of Gagik Grigoryan, the Signal messenger was used, and in the case of military serviceman Anton Khozhaev<\/a>, the Session messenger was used.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stage 3. Optional. Obtaining the evidence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Once contact has been established with the target, the next step is to obtain evidence. Law enforcement\u2019s goal at this stage is to persuade the target into taking some kind of action. This task is made significantly easier by Russia\u2019s courts, which show surprising leniency in evaluating evidence provided by law enforcement and are willing to see proof of guilt in virtually anything.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the cases considered in this report, charges were most often brought under the following articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: Art. 275 CC RF (\u2018Treason\u2019) appeared in about half the cases, Art. 205 CC RF (\u2018Terrorist Act\u2019) and Art. 205.5 CC RF (\u2018Organisation of and participation in activities of a terrorist organisation\u2019) each appeared in about a third of the cases. Art. 30 CC RF (\u2018Preparation of and attempt at a crime\u2019) was often used (in approximately two out of three cases), which indicates FSB officers uncovered the crime before it was committed. This does not mean that in all other cases arson was committed or the Russians in question fought with weapons in their hands as part of the Ukrainian armed forces. Simply it means that the criteria for what should be considered a completed <\/em>crime are often blurred. Similar actions in different cases can be interpreted, for example, as participation <\/em>in the activities of a terrorist organisation or as preparation <\/em>for such participation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aleksandr Fomenko<\/a>, encouraged by a new acquaintance he met during a short term in jail for an administrative-law offence, sent several messages by email and Telegram to the FRL. It would seem at least some of these messages were in fact addressed to FSB officers, while others did not reach their destination because of errors in the email address. Nevertheless, Fomenko was found guilty of treason and participation in a terrorist organisation. However, in other cases the investigative authorities and the court have interpreted similar actions as preparation <\/em>for treason and preparation <\/em>for participation in a terrorist organisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among cases with signs of entrapment, depending on the charges, three general categories can be distinguished:<\/p>\n\n\n\n