United Nations A/81/374

General Assembly

Distr.: General
15 September 2026

Original: English

Eighty-first session
Agenda item 70 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova, submitted in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 60/21.

26-13514 (E)

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Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova

“Traitors to the Motherland”: the strategy of fear and punishment of the Russian Federation to erase dissent at home and abroad

Summary

In the present report, the Special Rapporteur documents the further institutionalization of repression in the Russian Federation, already evidenced in her previous reports, and its increasingly militarized character, establishing that domestic repression and the war against Ukraine are mutually reinforcing. The use of the repressive legislation on “foreign agents” and “undesirable organizations”, as well as the abuse of the national security legislation, has been expanded, and politically motivated prison terms have been lengthened. Independent media, lawyers, anti-war activists, political opponents, religious and national minorities, and Indigenous Peoples’ and LGBT advocates faced intensified repression, while political participation and election observation were further curtailed. Militarization increasingly shaped public policies and education, including the growing military-patriotic education of children and the canonization of government-dictated historical narratives.

Torture and ill-treatment remained widespread, systematic and part of a government strategy of repression at home and aggression abroad, with persistent impunity. The report also addresses transnational repression, as well as the treatment of Ukrainian detainees held by Russian authorities.

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 60/21, includes information received by the Special Rapporteur up to 11 September 2026. It documents the consolidation of authoritarian control and the deepening fusion of the war of aggression against Ukraine with the escalation of repression at home and abroad. National security narratives recast the peaceful exercise of human rights as a threat and portray human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, women activists, Indigenous Peoples, LGBT persons, religious and national minorities and anti-war activists as "traitors to the Motherland", "foreign agents", "extremists", "subversives" and "enemies of the State". The "rule of fear" documented previously has hardened into an ordinary mode of governance.[1]

2. The reporting period brought an escalation of repression through new legislation, longer prison terms and the expanding abuse of national security and public safety legislation as part of a strategy to silence dissent and anti-war expression. The average prison term in politically motivated cases almost doubled, reflecting the stacking and reclassification of charges and more punitive sentencing. A record number of convictions for treason and espionage, the outlawing of leading human rights and LGBT organizations as "extremist", and coordinated action against Indigenous activists illustrate that escalation.

3. Militarization is a pervasive feature of repression. Military-patriotic instruction is embedded in education; fighting in the war against Ukraine is glorified as a marker of patriotism and masculinity, and is an escape from criminal liability for some. On the other hand, dissent, human rights advocacy and conscientious objection to the war are portrayed as betrayal and criminalized. Men are recruited or coerced into military service through contracts, forced mobilization and recruitment from prisons, exploiting vulnerabilities linked to poverty and debt. The recruitment of foreign nationals, including via trafficking in persons, exploits similar vulnerabilities. Women are placed under mounting pressure to conform to official "traditional values" and are assigned the role of bearing and raising the next generation, including future soldiers; their reproductive autonomy is restricted, and their exposure to trauma and violence from returning combatants is disregarded.

II. Methodology

4. The Russian authorities continued to ignore requests from the Special Rapporteur for engagement or a country visit. The present report therefore draws on a broad range of sources within and outside the Russian Federation, including submissions from Russian, Ukrainian and international organizations; consultations with more than 150 civil society representatives, including Russian activists in exile and Indigenous Peoples' advocates; first-hand testimony of victims, their relatives, witnesses and defence lawyers; analysis of legislation, court documents, official records and statistics; and verified open sources. Information was triangulated across independent sources and verified.

[1] See A/79/508, A/80/382, A/HRC/54/54, A/HRC/57/59, A/HRC/60/59 and A/HRC/63/60.

III. Civic space, expression and access to justice

A. “Foreign agents”, “undesirable organizations” and freedom of association

5. The “foreign agent” framework continued to operate as an instrument of mass stigmatization and criminalization. At the beginning of September 2026, the register contained 1,262 entries.[2] In October 2025, the threshold of criminal liability for evading the duties and reporting requirements attached to the designation was lowered from two prior administrative offences to one, without a time limit; the amendment entered into force in January 2026. Also from January 2026, anyone holding “foreign agent” status for even a single day during a tax period became subject to a punitive rate and was excluded from deductions and preferential tax treatment.[3] Amendments adopted in 2025 extended confiscation measures to the proceeds of offences such as “discrediting” the armed forces or calling for sanctions against the Russian Federation. Federal law No. 284-FZ of 4 August 2026 allows the freezing of bank accounts, restrictions on property transactions, driving and economic activity, and the denial of most consular and electronic government services to persons who are convicted of criminal offences or of politically motivated administrative offences and are living abroad. This is de facto a targeted punishment of anti-war voices and government critics en masse, designed to make life outside the Russian Federation unsustainable.[4]

6. The authorities stepped up the application and enforcement of the “foreign agent” law. In November 2025, video journalist Yuri Dud was sentenced in absentia to one year and 10 months’ imprisonment for failure to use the required label, the first custodial sentence imposed exclusively on that basis. Vladimir Dorokhov, Deputy Chair of the Yabloko party, was designated a “foreign agent” in 2024 based on three transfers totalling less than 1,000 roubles received from a taxi driver, a market trader and a courier. Rejecting his request for removal from the register in 2026, the Ministry of Justice relied on “evidence of political activity”, citing his attendance at a colleague’s court hearing and a birthday greeting published on the party’s website by its Chair.[5]

7. The “undesirable organization” and anti-extremism frameworks have continued to hollow out freedom of association. By early September 2026, 415 organizations had been designated “undesirable”, up from 245 a year earlier. In July 2026, a court in Moscow ordered the arrest in absentia of Zhanna Nemtsova, daughter of the assassinated opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, for organizing the activities of the “Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom” set up in his memory and banned in the Russian Federation as an “undesirable organization”. Criminal liability is increasingly attached not only to formal membership but to perceived affiliation, donations, receipt of funding or ordinary cooperation with designated organizations. In July 2026, a court in Nizhny Novgorod sentenced the activist Tatyana Arshinova to two years’ imprisonment for involvement in an “extremist” organization linked to the late opposition politician Alexei Navalny, on the basis of social media reposts, a photograph of Mr. Navalny, a letter she had written to him in prison and posts calling for his release and expressing sorrow at his death. In August 2026, Olga Sibireva, an expert of the Sova think tank, was charged with cooperation with an “undesirable organization” solely because the designated International Religious Freedom of

[2] See https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/pages/reestr-inostryannykh-agentov.

[3] Federal law No. 378-FZ of 15 October 2025 and Federal law No. 425-FZ of 28 November 2025.

[4] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2026/08/new-russian-law-inflicts-civic-death-government-critics-abroad-traitors.

[5] See https://www.yabloko.ru/cat-news/2026/07/23.

Belief Alliance had cited her reports; her home was searched, and her equipment and books were seized.[6]

B. Freedom of peaceful assembly

8. Public protest has been largely extinguished by criminalization, surveillance and demonstrative punishment. Civil society monitors recorded 362 arrests at assemblies in 2025, compared with 1,244 in 2024; the decline reflects the chilling effect of repression.[7] The consequences of protests against the abolition of rural councils in the Altai Republic illustrate the force with which the authorities punish peaceful dissent. On 1 June 2026, the Second Eastern District Military Court sentenced Aruna Arna, a protest organizer and mother of three, to five years' imprisonment for publicly "justifying terrorism", on the basis of social media posts of "The Internationale" and "Varshavianka" songs, neither of which is banned in the Russian Federation.

9. Even modest collective acts are treated as threats. The police disrupted letter-writing gatherings for political prisoners, while the Way Home movement of wives and mothers of mobilized men continued to face surveillance, arrests and "foreign agent" restrictions. In March 2026, at least 27 people were detained in several cities during protests against the blocking of Internet services. In August 2026, following the Supreme Court's upholding of the removal of the Yabloko party's federal list from the parliamentary elections, more than 85 people were detained outside the Court in Moscow.

C. Freedom of opinion and expression

10. Human rights defenders and ordinary citizens continue to face imprisonment for exercising freedom of expression, above all anti-war expression. In July 2026, a court in Yekaterinburg sentenced Alexey Sokolov, the founder of the human rights organization "Pravovaya Osnova" ("Legal Basis"), to two years' compulsory labour for displaying the Facebook logo, treated as an "extremist symbol";[8] in December 2025, he was arrested on treason charges for providing information about torture to a French lawyer.[9] In September 2026, Lida Moniava, founder of a children's hospice, was arrested on a charge of disseminating "fake news" about the army over social media posts concerning the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; she was subsequently released pending trial and faces up to 10 years' imprisonment. In April 2026, three years after the Vesna youth movement was designated "extremist", the St. Petersburg City Court sentenced six of its participants to imprisonment terms ranging from six years and two months to 12 years for anti-war expression and calls for peaceful protest under extremism-related provisions.[10]

Journalists

11. Independent journalists continue to be systematically targeted. The number of new criminal cases and convictions, primarily in absentia, continues to grow. Since July 2025, at least 61 sentences have been handed down, and 102 new criminal cases

[6] See https://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/2026/07/d54071.
[7] Data from OVD-Info.
[8] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/01/russia-must-drop-charges-against-human-rights-defender-alexey.
[9] See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TmSearch/RelCom?code=RUS+2%2F2026.
[10] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/strategy-blatant-abuse-counter-terrorism-and-extremism-laws-destroy-russian.

were opened against Russian journalists, including at least 19 cases on "extremism" and terrorism-related charges.

12. Reporting on prisoners' military recruitment, army veterans' crimes and military contracts is suppressed as "discreditation" of, or "fake news" about, the armed forces. At least 18 media workers were sentenced on "fake news" charges, and at least 14 new cases have been opened against journalists since July 2025. In August 2026, a criminal case was opened against a prominent journalist, Katerina Gordeeva, on "fake news" charges over posts concerning the conduct of Russian forces towards Ukrainian civilians.

13. As of early September 2026, the authorities had designated 256 journalists, 95 media outlets and 65 bloggers as "foreign agents", and at least 33 new criminal cases had been opened against journalists on charges related to non-compliance with "foreign agent" requirements since July 2025. On 4 September 2026, the independent newspaper *Novaya Gazeta* was designated a "foreign agent", and more than 100 people connected with its work were added to the list of persons affiliated with a "foreign agent". Although such persons are not fully designated as "foreign agents", they are required to use the mandatory label in publications and social media posts concerning the designated outlet, and they face liability for violations. Since its inception, around 350 individuals have been listed in the register of "foreign agents" as "participants", at least 267 of them since July 2025, marking a drastic uptick over the past year. At least 92 were listed in both capacities – as "foreign agents" and "participants".

14. Media workers also remained targeted by "undesirable organization" charges, with at least eight new cases against them since July 2025. At least four media-related organizations were designated "undesirable" over the past year. Organizations supporting independent journalism were also designated, among them Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists, placing media workers affiliated with them at risk of prosecution. In August 2026, a criminal case was opened against the founder of TV Rain, Natalia Sindeeva, and its chief executive, Mark Ten, who face up to six years' imprisonment on "undesirable" charges. Since July 2025, at least 55 cases have involved media outlets designated "undesirable": in at least 21, individuals were prosecuted for working as journalists for such outlets; also in at least 21, for disseminating their material, including reposts and links; and in at least 13, for giving comments or interviews to them.[11]

15. In May 2026, the Supreme Court of Buryatia sentenced Vasilisa Shishkina, an editor of the regional outlet *Nomer Odin*, to 12 years' imprisonment for treason. She had reported on alleged violations of the rights of mobilized men from Buryatia.

Cultural figures

16. Writers, artists, musicians and other cultural figures remain subject to blacklists, prosecution and censorship for their anti-war stance. Cultural institutions are pressured to endorse the war, books by designated authors are removed from sale or study, and the performance of songs by exiled artists is punished. In October 2025, members of the street band Stoptime, whose lead singer is Naoko, spent more than a month in administrative detention in Saint Petersburg for performing anti-war songs in public. In August 2026, a court in Moscow sentenced the comedian Semyon Slepakov in absentia to community service for violation of "foreign agent" labelling requirements. Since 2022, he has published parody songs satirizing the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the Russian armed forces. In July 2026, a court in Moscow similarly sentenced the singer Monetochka (Yelizaveta

[11] According to data received from the Mass Media Defence Centre.

Gyrdymova) in absentia to one year's imprisonment on the same charges; she had publicly opposed the war and raised funds for Ukrainian civilians.

Religious figures

17. Clergy of different confessions continue to be targeted with defrocking and prosecution for anti-war positions. In September 2025, the Balashikha City Court in the Moscow region sentenced the Protestant pastor Nikolay Romanyuk to four years' imprisonment on charges of issuing calls against national security over a 2022 anti-war sermon. In December 2025, the Sloviansk City Court in Krasnodarsky Krai fined the independent Orthodox priest Iona (Ilya Sigida) four times, including for "discrediting" the armed forces, and opened a criminal case against him. In April 2026, Buddhist leader Ilya Vasilyev was sentenced in Moscow to six years' imprisonment for "fake news" about the army over a social media post about a Russian missile strike on Kherson. State-aligned religious institutions are used to disseminate pro-war narratives, while sermons and prayers for peace attract persecution. As of early September 2026, 173 Jehovah's Witnesses were in custody.[12]

Academia

18. A Russian government study in June 2026 estimated that public and academic libraries could lose up to 15 per cent of their holdings, and some municipal libraries up to 70 per cent, if a person or organization designated as a "foreign agent" or "undesirable" had contributed to a book's authorship, translation, illustration, editing or publication. The designation of foreign universities as "undesirable" endangers scholarly works, dissertations and teaching materials that draw on their publications or cite their faculty and graduates. In Yaroslavl, employees of several local universities were fined in November and December 2025 over long-standing links on university websites to the British Council and Yale University, both designated "undesirable" in June and July 2025, respectively.

D. Digital surveillance and access to information

19. Deliberate mobile Internet shutdowns became a routine instrument of control. Access Now catalogued 20 shutdowns imposed by the Russian authorities in 2025, 17 domestically and 3 in Ukraine (occupied territories), and recorded the Russian Federation as one of the States imposing the largest number of mobile Internet shutdowns that year. "Na Svyazi", which monitors connectivity disruptions in the Russian Federation, recorded a total of 11,715 shutdowns by mid-2026. Voice calls through WhatsApp and Telegram were progressively restricted, and WhatsApp was blocked nationwide in February 2026. The State messenger, MAX, has been made mandatory on devices sold in the country and promoted coercively in schools, universities and the public sector, embedding surveillance in everyday communication. In July 2026, the European Union listed MAX under its sanctions regime and cited the control of its development by the Federal Security Service and its extensive surveillance capabilities, including the tracking of virtual private network (VPN) use, as grounds for the designation.

20. According to the digital rights organization RKS Global, beginning in March 2026, the new measures by the Russian authorities substantially increased the scale and effectiveness of censorship and led to mass blockings of VPN services.

[12] See https://www.forum18.org.

21. Laws that entered into force in September 2025 penalize searching online for "extremist materials", restrict the advertising of VPNs and treat the use of circumvention tools as an aggravating circumstance.[13] As of August 2026, at least five cases had been opened on these charges. Liability has thus expanded from publishing prohibited content to seeking information itself.

E. State ideology, historical memory and the militarization of education

22. Law, education and public memory are being reshaped around an official historical narrative that presents the current war as a continuation of the Second World War. Federal law No. 100-FZ of 9 April 2026 extended article 243.4 of the Criminal Code concerning the vandalization of military graves and article 354.1 concerning the "rehabilitation of Nazism" to include vandalizing memorials to victims of the "genocide of the Soviet people" or its denial. Institutions and initiatives preserving the memory of Soviet repression came under further pressure: the Supreme Court declared the Memorial movement "extremist" in April 2026, and the Museum of the History of the Gulag in Moscow, closed to visitors since late 2024, was replaced in 2026 by a Museum of Memory devoted to Nazi crimes against Soviet citizens. Access to archives on Soviet repression has been further restricted. In September 2026, Russian authorities erected a new monument to Russian servicemen killed in the war against Ukraine in place of the memorial to Polish and Lithuanian victims of the Stalinist purges that was dismantled in 2023.

23. The militarization of childhood intensified, with a sharp increase in membership of children's military-patriotic movements indicating the emergence of the de facto military "recruitment pipeline".[14] From September 2026, the share of teaching time devoted to basic military training within the compulsory subject "Fundamentals of security and defence of the Motherland" for grades 6 to 11 increased from approximately 20 to 50 per cent. A new subject, "Spiritual and moral culture of Russia", was also introduced, aimed at transmitting State-defined "traditional spiritual and moral values".

24. Teachers, academics, students and schoolchildren who dissent face dismissal, expulsion, surveillance and prosecution. Reporting on children from "disloyal" families and the redistribution of educational resources towards military and security programmes deepen institutional control. In March 2026, a court in Chelyabinsk banned the film *Mr Nobody Against Putin*, an Academy Award-winning documentary on the militarization of children's education filmed over two years by Pavel Talankin, a teacher in Karabash, Chelyabinsk region, for promoting "extremism" and "terrorism". Mr. Talankin was designated a "foreign agent".

F. Fair trial and access to justice and lawyers

25. Judicial safeguards continue to deteriorate. Politically sensitive and national security proceedings are frequently held in camera, decisions remain unpublished, and monitors are excluded or harassed. Pretrial detention is used by default for non-violent offences, prosecution experts who are not impartial supply contrived linguistic "analysis" for speech convictions, and secret witnesses remain common in extremism and terrorism cases.

[13] Federal laws No. 281-FZ and No. 282-FZ of 31 July 2025.

[14] See https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/666398.

26. Interference with the legal profession has intensified. In 2025, at least 13 criminal cases were opened against lawyers, compared with three or four annually in 2023 and 2024. A 2025 survey by the Federal Chamber of Lawyers found that a majority of defence lawyers encountered obstruction as a matter of routine: most reported late notice of investigative actions, pressure on their clients to confess, and examination of case materials reduced to a formality, and around half reported threats of disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability and obstruction in accessing physical evidence.

27. The authorities increasingly identify lawyers with their clients and criminalize ordinary defence work. In March 2026, charges against Maria Bontsler, in detention since May 2025, were reclassified as treason. She has a serious chronic health condition, yet the authorities refuse to provide her with adequate medical care.[15] In November 2025, Ivan Pavlov and Evgeny Smirnov, lawyers from First Department, were charged with revealing State secrets for transmitting classified case materials to an expert preparing an opinion for the defence.

28. Additional pressure includes the disbarment of lawyers living abroad for more than a year, including those forced into exile, and judicial interference in the self-governance of the bar, illustrated in April 2026 when a district court in Moscow terminated the status of three lawyers despite the refusal of the Moscow Chamber of Advocates to do so. In January 2026, lawyer Oleg Stepanov, who had expressed an anti-war position and left the country, was detained on his return on terrorism-related charges and is currently being held in Krasnodar.

G. Politically motivated seizure of assets and persecution of businessmen

29. Repression is also used to restructure the economy around the war and political loyalty. Private businesses face retroactive anti-corruption and "nationalization" proceedings, coerced transfers of ownership and fabricated criminal cases. From 2022 to early September 2026, more than 150 "nationalization" cases were recorded, involving assets valued at approximately 7.6 trillion roubles.[16] Such cases are typically decided within two months and often at a single hearing. Businesses and assets are transferred to the State or to loyal actors and used to support the war.

30. Extremism designations are increasingly relied on to confiscate and redistribute the assets and businesses of persons accused of holding anti-war views or supporting Ukraine, and the proceeds are redirected to sustain the war. Between 2023 and 2024, the Konti-Rus confectionery factory in Kursk, the Roshen confectionery factory in Lipetsk, the Amber Talvis distillery in the Tambov region and the Global Spirits holding were seized or nationalized after their Ukrainian owners, among them the former President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, were designated extremists or accused of financing the armed forces of Ukraine. The practice has continued and expanded: in 2025, assets worth around 500 billion roubles were seized from the KDV Group over alleged support for Ukraine.[17]

31. In May 2025, assets of Andrey Korovayko, the founder of Pokrovsky Concern, were confiscated, including 372 real estate objects valued at 1.6 billion roubles; in 2023 and 2024, his and his partners' 110 companies, primarily in agrarian businesses, valued at over 200 billion roubles, were similarly confiscated, on allegations of

[15] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/russia-must-release-ill-lawyer-maria-bontsler-detained-retaliation-human.

[16] See https://nationalization.nsplaw.com.

[17] See https://zona.media/news/2025/10/02/shtengelovs.

corruption due to his brief stint as a public official in the early 2000s. Mr. Korovayko appealed the expropriations, claiming that he had built his businesses after leaving public service and connecting the expropriation to his refusal to support the war effort.

32. In March 2022, Anatoly Chubais, a former senior official and the best-known economic reformer in the Russian Federation, left the country and resigned from his government post after sending a letter to Mr. Putin criticizing the decision to invade Ukraine and urging an immediate end to hostilities; he was thereafter publicly attacked by the President. A campaign against him and his associates began in January 2025 after two senior members of the State Duma, Andrei Kartapolov and Andrei Lugovoy, sent a formal request to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation and the Prosecutor General's Office to investigate Mr. Chubais, claiming that "the country lost funds that would have been very much needed in the special military operation zone". Mr. Lugovoy, whom authorities of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland had identified as the prime suspect in the 2006 poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with polonium in London, was never extradited by the Russian Federation to stand trial. Mr. Lugovoy called Mr. Chubais a "traitor who shamefully fled Russia" and warned that "the enemy must be punished" while alleging that Mr. Chubais had close ties to British authorities.[18] At least 22 persons connected to the Rosnano Corporation face criminal charges of embezzlement, relating to the period during which Mr. Chubais headed it, and civil claims have been brought in parallel. In April 2026, Boris Galkin and, in September 2026, Andrei Kushnaryov were sentenced to nine years' imprisonment; in June and July 2026, Andrei Malyshev and Irina Rapoport received sentences of 12 and 15 years in absentia, respectively.

H. Persecution of political opposition

33. Members of the political opposition, their supporters and independent election observers are at heightened risk both as individuals and through the dismantling of the avenues of lawful political participation on which they depend. Preparations for the State Duma elections of September 2026 show a shift from the prosecution of individual leaders to the dismantling of those avenues: party activity, nomination, observation, campaigning, media access and voting.

34. Yabloko, the only registered party consistently maintaining an anti-war position, was targeted throughout the electoral cycle: by July 2026, 7 of its members were in prison or pretrial detention, 12 had been designated "foreign agents", and 37 had faced administrative proceedings for public statements. Thirteen members, including the party Chair, Nikolai Rybakov, and elected regional and municipal deputies, had been sanctioned for displaying "extremist symbols", resulting in their exclusion from the 2026 elections.

35. In June 2026, a court in Moscow sentenced the Yabloko Deputy Chair, Maksim Kruglov, to seven years' imprisonment for "fake news" about the army; in August, another Deputy Chair, Lev Shlosberg, was sentenced to 11 years and one month's imprisonment on "war censorship" charges. On the same day, the Central Electoral Commission removed Yabloko from the federal ballot, which removes a party from the guaranteed nationwide space for public political debate.

[18] See https://rtvi.com/news/vrag-dolzhen-byt-nakazan-kartapolov-i-lugovoj-oczenili-vinu-chubajsa-pered-rossiej.

36. In July 2026, Boris Nadezhdin was designated a “foreign agent” and prosecuted for displaying “extremist symbols” – a photograph of Alexei Navalny – after contesting the State Duma elections. In early August 2026, he left for France, describing the choice he faced as “either exile or prison”.

IV. Abuse of national security and public safety legislation to silence dissent

A. Treason, espionage and confidential cooperation

37. The use of charges of treason, espionage, and confidential cooperation with a foreign actor reached record levels and is directed above all at silencing dissent and anti-war expression. In 2025, there were 468 convictions under those provisions, the highest number yet and some 30 per cent above the previous year, with no acquittals and a median sentence of 15 years. Those arrested for treason included a 17-year-old boy, Valentin Tsyganok, and an 80-year-old scientist, Valeriy Zvegintsev; around one third were Ukrainian citizens, predominantly from occupied territory, and one in six were women.[19]

38. Russian citizens with no access to State secrets make up the largest group of defendants. In July 2026, the Moscow City Court sentenced journalist Darya Shipacheva to 12 years’ imprisonment on treason charges for a money transfer to Ukraine, where her relatives live. Prior to her arrest, she was bullied and threatened online for her feminist posts and campaigning.

39. In such cases, charges are increasingly escalated from confidential cooperation to treason or are combined with terrorism-related charges, which results in closed military court trials and harsher sentences.

40. Authorities continue to use online entrapment to manufacture cases and “carousel” administrative detentions to prepare indictments while the person remains in custody, often under torture.[20] In late 2025, Leonid Katz, a mathematics student, spent more than six weeks in custody under consecutive administrative detentions for alleged profanity towards and disobedience of the police. In December 2025, immediately on completing the fourth term, he was remanded on a charge of treason. In August 2025, after nearly two months of successive administrative arrests, Oleg Kuryayev was taken to the Federal Security Service headquarters in Moscow, where he was beaten and subjected to electric shocks to extract a confession before being remanded in custody on treason charges.

B. Terrorism and extremism

41. Counter-terrorism and anti-extremism laws continue to be abused to target civic activism and anti-war expression. In April 2026, following a closed hearing, the human rights organization Memorial, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was banned as “extremist”, followed by OVD-Info in June, exposing those affiliated with them to risk of persecution, as well as incapacitating their human rights monitoring and legal aid efforts inside the Russian Federation. In November 2025, the Supreme Court declared Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation a “terrorist” organization and, in March 2026, did the same regarding the Russian Anti-War Committee. Both rulings banned any activities by those organizations throughout the country, extending criminal exposure to supporters, donors and persons who merely publicize their materials.

[19] See https://dept.one/story/gosizmena-2025.
[20] A/80/382, para. 61, and A/HRC/60/59, para. 80.

42. Counter-terrorism provisions are applied to statements containing no incitement to violence and to alleged acts of arson or vandalism reclassified as terrorism or sabotage. The prosecution of these charges has drastically intensified: in the first half of 2026, at least 1,234 persons were convicted on terrorism-related charges, 38 per cent more than during the same period in 2025; at the same time, over one third of those persons were convicted in politically motivated trials.[21]

43. Crimean Tatars in the occupied Crimea continue to be prosecuted as members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, designated a terrorist organization, including four women – Esma Nimetulayeva, Nasiba Saidova, Elviza Aliyeva and Fevziye Osmanova – detained in October 2025.[22] Between November 2025 and May 2026, the Southern District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced 10 Crimean Tatar men to terms of between 13 and 20 years' imprisonment on terrorism-related charges and forcible seizure of power.

44. More than 22,000 people were on the Rosfinmonitoring list of "terrorists and extremists" by August 2026. Listing entails extrajudicial financial restrictions, property limitations and exclusion from professions and can affect a designated person's ability to open a bank account abroad. Children are the fastest-growing group on the register: almost 1,100 persons have been entered on it while still children, more than 95 per cent of them since February 2022; roughly 1 in 12 new entries now concerns a child, and the restrictions follow a child into adulthood.[23]

45. Amendments adopted in November 2025 increased penalties and extended criminal responsibility for terrorism offences to children from the age of 14. Arseny Turbin, who was sentenced in 2024 as a child to five years' imprisonment on terrorism-related charges, faces new charges of participation in a mass riot in a juvenile colony.

46. Naturalized citizens convicted under extremism-related provisions continue to be deprived of nationality as an additional punishment, exposing them to the risk of statelessness or prolonged migration detention. In April 2026, Maksim Polovnikov, who had served a two-year sentence for online comments deemed to "justify terrorism", including one concerning the dispersal of anti-war protests, had his Russian citizenship revoked and was expelled to Azerbaijan with a five-year ban on re-entry.

V. Exporting the rule of fear beyond borders: transnational repression

47. The Special Rapporteur has examined the transnational dimension of the repressive system in a dedicated report to the Human Rights Council at its sixty-third session, evidencing it to be a widespread, systematic and institutionalized instrument of State policy, extending the domestic system of repression beyond the country's borders in order to punish dissent and anti-war expression.[24] Documented incidents rose roughly eightfold annually on average after February 2022, and sentences imposed in absentia rose from 4 in 2022 to 157 in 2025, targeting political opponents, journalists, human rights defenders, anti-war activists, conscientious objectors and members of the diaspora. Domestic frameworks are given effect abroad through politically motivated prosecutions; the abuse of extradition, International Criminal Police Organization mechanisms and mutual legal assistance; confiscation and

[21] See https://dept.one/story/terrorism-1-2026.
[22] Data received from Crimean Solidarity and the Crimean Tatar Resource Centre.
[23] See https://dept.one/story/youth-rfn-2026.
[24] See A/HRC/63/60.

financial restrictions propagated through international banking-compliance databases; the denial of passports and consular services; digital surveillance; strategic litigation against public participation; and the intimidation of relatives, increasingly through proxies that obscure attribution. Federal law No. 284-FZ of 4 August 2026 extends restrictions on property, consular and civic rights to persons outside the country, confirming a whole-of-government approach.[25]

48. Deserters and conscientious objectors have been extradited or forcibly returned from neighbouring States, while others remain stranded without documentation. Exiled Indigenous and minority activists are prosecuted in absentia, and their relatives are targeted inside the Russian Federation. [26] At the same time, the Russian Federation is a host State for transnational repression by others, granting the vast majority of Belarusian extradition requests, and a State that removes nationals of Central Asian States to face politically motivated prosecution. The Special Rapporteur recalls that persons refusing to participate in the war of aggression may require international protection and that third States are obliged to assess the risk of refoulement rigorously.

VI. Forced mobilization and conscientious objection

A. Conscription, coercive recruitment and conscientious objection

49. The mandatory conscription system of the Russian Federation is increasingly feeding the wartime mobilization campaign, with conscription becoming permanent and digitally enforced. A law of November 2025 introduced year-round conscription from January 2026, alongside electronic summonses deemed served after seven days and the imposition of automatic restrictions on travel, driving and property transactions for failure to appear at military draft offices. The register of persons liable for conscription into military service is linked to other State databases, and the authorities use facial recognition infrastructure to locate those evading the draft. There is evidence that commanders have pressured and forced conscripts into signing contracts with the Ministry of Defence to join the war against Ukraine. In January 2026, the parents of nine conscripts from the Khakasia, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions, who had been called up for military service in December 2025, submitted a collective complaint to the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, alleging that their sons had been tortured to coerce them into signing military contracts.

50. As part of the mobilization effort, coercion into military contracts to fight in the war includes beatings, sleep deprivation, forged signatures and threats.

51. Servicemen refusing deployment to the front are held without legal basis in pits, basements and other unofficial sites in the occupied territory of Ukraine, where they face torture and threats of execution to force them back into combat. By July 2026, at least 29 such sites had been documented. Following legislative amendments in 2024, criminal suspects, accused persons and convicts can have their sentences commuted or prosecutions dropped for signing military contracts, embedding impunity in the mobilization and military recruitment system. By December 2025, investigative journalists at Vyorstka, an online media outlet, calculated that over 1,000 people had been killed or severely injured by returning combatants, including 551 deaths and 465 life-threatening injuries. In approximately 90 per cent of court judgments reviewed, the courts treated military service, combat status or related circumstances as mitigating factors.

[25] Ibid.

[26] A/80/382, para. 47.

52. In a documentary broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in February 2026, four Russian servicemen who had left the country described the execution of fellow soldiers on the orders of commanders for refusing orders. One recounted a commander shooting four men who had fled the front line; another described some 20 bodies in a pit after such killings. They also described soldiers held in pits, starved for days and tortured with electric shocks before being sent into combat unarmed.

53. A study submitted to the Special Rapporteur found substantial ethnic disparities in military fatalities. Ethnic Buryats accounted for approximately 2.3 per cent of recorded Russian casualties while constituting about 0.34 per cent of the population, with comparable disparities among Tuvans and several other minority groups. Bashkortostan and Tatarstan remained among the regions with the highest absolute losses in 2025, and ethnic republics continued to rank prominently in losses per capita. Recruitment quotas are imposed on regions, military units, educational institutions and businesses and have extended beyond military structures. Prisoners, migrants and foreign nationals are targeted with promises of pardon and citizenship or with threats of deportation and prosecution.[27]

B. Coercive recruitment of foreign nationals into the armed forces and trafficking in persons

54. The recruitment of foreign nationals into the Russian armed forces has acquired a transnational and increasingly coercive character through trafficking in persons. This involves false offers of employment, education and citizenship opportunities directed at nationals of over 45 countries from Africa, Latin America, including Cuba and Peru, and South and Central Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan.[28] A recurring pattern of trafficking in persons involves the promise of civilian work in the Russian Federation, confiscation of identity documents on arrival and coercion into signing military contracts, through torture and threats, drawn up in Russian, a language the recruits often do not understand, followed by deployment to the front with no further information on their whereabouts.

55. In February 2026, the National Assembly of Kenya was informed that more than 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight in the Russian army, including victims of trafficking in persons. Kenyan authorities established the existence of an organized transnational trafficking syndicate recruiting Kenyan citizens under false pretences and coercively deploying them to fight against Ukraine. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, denied Russian government involvement in the recruitment.[29] In August 2026, Peruvian authorities identified 459 persons – including victims of trafficking in persons – coerced to fight against Ukraine and stated that 11 Peruvians had been killed and 114 were missing.[30] In June 2026, the authorities of Bangladesh stated that a group of 30 workers had been trafficked to the Russian Federation and forced to fight in Ukraine;[31] a Russian commander told a Bangladeshi victim: “Your agent sent you here. We bought you.” In May 2026, the Migration Agency of Uzbekistan warned of citizens being drawn into fighting in armed conflicts with deceptive offers of employment, legal assistance

[27] See https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/31/ryazan-governor-orders-businesses-to-set-military-recruitment-quotas-a92390.

[28] See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0081_EN.html.

[29] See https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2026-06-23-how-african-states-have-responded-to-recruitment-of-citizens-into-russia-ukraine-war.

[30] See https://x.com/CancilleriaPeru/status/2086498956968648785.

[31] See https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/1101de987d62.

or expedited citizenship opportunities.[32] Foreign nationals who are prisoners of war in Ukraine may face criminal charges as mercenaries on return to their countries, irrespective of being victims of trafficking in persons.

VII. Torture: State strategy of impunity

A. Patterns of torture and the torturing environment

56. Torture and ill-treatment remained widespread and systematic in the Russian Federation and part of a government strategy of repression at home and aggression abroad, with persistent impunity. The use of previously documented methods of torture continued and was further entrenched while reinforcing impunity and weakening safeguards for victims; the concentration of investigation and custody in the Federal Security Service, the denunciation of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, due to take effect on 1 November 2026, and the outlawing of organizations that documented abuse are removing successive layers of external and domestic scrutiny.

57. Beatings, electric shocks, suffocation, sexualized violence, psychological torture and threats in places of detention, as well as the use of detainees to inflict such torture on other detainees, acting on orders of prison administrations, persist. These practices can also be considered through the concept of a "torturing environment", discussed in the work of Pau Pérez-Sales, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which highlights how different acts and conditions may operate cumulatively and reinforce one another.[33] Impunity further sustains such an environment by making the prospect of renewed violence permanent, including at moments when no violence is being inflicted.

58. In April 2026, Svetlana Savelyeva was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on treason-related charges based on confessions extracted under torture, including threats of sexual violence.[34] In December 2025, Svetlana Tolkacheva, a resident of the Kursk region with cancer, was detained on similar charges, for correspondence with a humanitarian volunteer in Georgia. Ms. Tolkacheva shared a cell with Ms. Savelyeva and, according to information received, was tortured with electric shocks allegedly by the same Federal Security Service officers who tortured Ms. Savelyeva. No investigation into the torture of either woman was conducted.

59. In April 2026, in Tulun, Irkutsk region, traffic police inspector Viktor Askhayev was detained by the Federal Security Service after complaining about alleged corruption and was beaten and raped by three Federal Security Service officers with a traffic-control baton in the presence of a female investigator from the Investigative Committee. Despite emergency medical assistance being provided, he was left in the custody of the same officers. Authorities initially refused to investigate, but a military prosecutor later ordered further examination. In September 2026, Mr. Askhayev was fined in a separate case alleging the unlawful use of personal data in apparent retaliation for his complaint.

60. In the case of mass torture, including rape and sexualized violence in penitentiary facilities in the Irkutsk region in 2020, affecting 200–300 prisoners and perpetrated by both officials and detainees acting on the orders of the administration,

[32] See https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-bangladesh-migrant-workers-d7df6a8b2ff60b46ce8e3fa3aafaf60e; and see https://gov.uz/en/migration/news/view/165436.

[33] See https://www.pauperez.cat/en/thematic/articles/torture/incommunicado-detention-and-torture-in-spainpart-iii-five-days-is-enough-the-concept-of-torturing-environments.

[34] A/HRC/60/59, para. 80.

three persons of the eight initially charged were convicted in November 2025; the others signed military contracts to avoid accountability and were deployed to the war against Ukraine. Charges relating to torture also continue to be reclassified as less serious offences, resulting in disproportionately lenient penalties.

B. Political prisoners

61. As of early September 2026, 4,968 persons were subject to politically motivated criminal prosecution, including 2,178 who were incarcerated.[35] These figures are conservative, as access to information on politically motivated prosecutions is restricted. The average prison term in politically motivated cases rose from six years and seven months in 2021 to 11 years in 2026.[36]

62. The use of torture in politically motivated cases continues to be widespread. In October 2025, Alexei Dmitriev, detained in a terrorism-related case in connection with a Marxist group, reported that he had been beaten and threatened with rape in the pretrial detention facility SIZO-5 in Yekaterinburg after refusing to incriminate himself. In May 2026, mathematician Azat Miftakhov, who is currently serving a politically motivated sentence in a prison colony, reported being subjected to torture with beatings, electric shocks, choking and threats of sexual violence by prison staff and inmate "activists" – acting on orders of the prison administration – due to his refusal to comply with the administration's humiliating demands.

63. At least 55 political prisoners have died in detention since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2022 and the subsequent harshening of persecution, with at least six dying in 2026. Gravely ill political prisoners, older detainees and detainees with disabilities continue to be denied adequate treatment and release on health grounds. In August 2025, Crimean Tatar political prisoner Lenur Khalilov, serving his sentence in the Arkhangelsk region, was released with terminal cancer; in October, the decision to release was overturned, and he was returned to detention. Despite continuing concerns over his health, Alexei Gorinov remained subject to punitive detention in 2026, including repeated placement in solitary confinement and cell-type isolation.[37]

64. The use of punitive psychiatry against government critics and anti-war voices continues. By May 2026, the health of Yakut shaman Alexander Gabyshev had deteriorated after more than five years of compulsory psychiatric treatment.

65. Solitary confinement continues to be applied to political prisoners, especially those convicted on terrorism-related charges. Teymur Abdullayev, a Crimean Tatar activist serving 16 and a half years for membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir, has spent almost half of his prison sentence since 2020 in such isolation.

C. Detention and treatment of Ukrainians

66. Ukrainian civilians detained by the Russian Federation remain of particular concern. They are arbitrarily detained in the occupied territories, subjected to enforced disappearance and held incommunicado, while torture and ill-treatment continue with impunity. In June 2026, Ukrainian authorities identified 1,877 Ukrainian civilians in Russian detention. In February 2026, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stated that about 7,000 Ukrainian prisoners of war remained

[35] See https://ovd.info/en/pulse/criminal.
[36] See https://memopzk.org/en/analytics/enemies-not-criminals.
[37] A/79/508, para. 43.

in Russian captivity. Since 2022, Ukraine has secured the return of 9,446 persons from Russian captivity, including only 457 civilians as of June 2026.

67. Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilian detainees continue to be prosecuted on extremism, terrorism, espionage and treason charges for their affiliation with or support for Ukraine. Between September 2025 and August 2026, courts in the Russian Federation and the occupied territories sentenced at least 585 Ukrainians in politically motivated cases – 226 civilians and 359 military personnel – mainly under terrorism-related provisions.[38] Ukrainian prisoners of war continue to be tried as civilians, as the Russian Federation does not recognize them as prisoners of war and subjects them to criminal prosecution for acts that are lawful as combatant conduct. They are often prosecuted under terrorism-related provisions for membership in Ukrainian military regiments declared "terrorist organizations" by the Russian Federation since 2022. In May 2026, captured Azov serviceman Dmitry Selizar was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment, while the existing 25-year sentence of another captured Azov serviceman, Nikolai Kuzmenko, was increased to 27 years.

68. Torture, including rape and sexual violence against Ukrainian detainees, is pervasive. Courts routinely admit confessions obtained through torture and fail to order investigations. Oleksandr Savov, a Ukrainian prisoner of war from the Mykolaiv region, spent nearly three years in Russian detention before his release in March 2025. He died eight months later, following torture and deteriorating health in captivity. His diary, shared with the Special Rapporteur, documents torture, including electric shocks, beatings, the setting of dogs on detainees, forced nudity, sexualized humiliation, the denial of medical care and the concealment of abuse before official outside inspections. Interviews by the Special Rapporteur with other Ukrainian detainees corroborated these accounts, including his testimony about the participation of medical personnel in torture.

69. As previously documented by the Special Rapporteur, medical personnel routinely participate in, condone or fail to report the torture of Ukrainian detainees.[39] In July 2026, Ukrainian authorities opened a criminal case on charges of torture against Vyacheslav Cherdantsev, a medical worker of the Pakino penal colony, for subjecting detainees to sexualized humiliation and forcing detainees to simulate a sexual act, writing sexualized messages and painting phallic symbols on their bodies, denying medical care, and ordering guards to beat detainees seeking medical assistance. In one case, he allegedly severely beat a detainee who had refused to comply with his sexual demand.

70. In February 2026, the Skhemy project of Radio Liberty examined leaked text and audio messages, photos and videos apparently sent and received over a three-year period by Russian Major General Roman Demurchiev. In this correspondence with his soldiers and family members, he discussed the torture and killing of Ukrainian prisoners of war, shared photographs of severed ears and joked about collecting them as a "garland". General Demurchiev reported that three captured Ukrainian servicemen had been beaten to death with entrenching shovels by Russian soldiers who were former prison inmates, after which their commander suggested nominating them for military awards.[40]

71. In August 2026, the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that 438 Ukrainian detainees had died in Russian captivity since the beginning of the war. Between May 2025 and May 2026, the remains of 169

[38] Data received from Memorial.

[39] See A/79/508.

[40] See https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-skhemy-otrymaly-dostup-do-perepysok-henerala-rf/33682706.html.

Ukrainian soldiers and civilian detainees were repatriated – 375 bodies in total had been returned since 2022 – with autopsies revealing torture and the denial of medical care as causes of death.

VIII. Groups at risk of politically motivated repression

A. Persons targeted on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity

72. The designation of the so-called "international LGBT movement" as "extremist" in 2023 has developed into a systematic framework for criminal prosecution. In the past year, courts convicted 16 individuals on extremism charges, bringing the total to 21. In 2026, courts convicted three employees of a queer nightclub in Orenburg and four associated with a bar in Kirov on extremism-related charges, imposing sentences of up to seven years' imprisonment.[41] Between March and July 2026, courts banned more than 10 LGBT organizations as "extremist", criminalizing support for them and exposing their staff, volunteers and clients to prosecution.

B. Ethnic minorities and Indigenous Peoples

73. Indigenous and minority advocacy is broadly relabelled as terrorism or extremism, while State-aligned representatives are used internationally to discredit independent voices. Indigenous Peoples' advocates voicing criticism of the Russian Federation for its treatment of ethnic minorities and Indigenous Peoples, disproportionate targeting for army recruitment, land dispossession and the erosion of cultural and linguistic identities are targeted by authorities. The designation of 55 ethnic, Indigenous rights and decolonial groups as "extremist" in 2024 and as "terrorist" in 2025 paved the way for targeting advocates affiliated with the groups. In December 2025, the Federal Security Service raided and detained Indigenous activists across several regions in connection with the Aborigen Forum network. The crackdown affected at least 17 Indigenous activists, several of whom were subsequently forced to flee the country.[42] The Aborigen Forum was an informal network of Indigenous advocates that ceased its activities following its designation as "extremist" in 2024. It was subsequently included in the Russian list of 172 organizations designated as "terrorist".

74. Indigenous human rights defenders Daria Egereva and Natalia Leongardt were detained as a result of these raids. They have remained in pretrial detention since December 2025 on terrorism-related charges in connection with the Aborigen Forum and face sentences of up to 20 years' imprisonment.

C. Migrants, asylum-seekers and stateless persons

75. Mass "anti-migrant" police raids continue, accompanied by collective detentions, violence, harassment and racial profiling targeting migrant workers and people perceived as having a non-Slavic appearance. Reports also indicate that some migrants have been subjected to coercion to sign military contracts. In December 2025, scores of migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were beaten by police during a police raid on a café and a vehicle depot in Khabarovsk, and an Uzbek

[41] See https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/08/24/briefing-paper-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-the-russian-federation.

[42] Submission from the International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia.

national died after being beaten. The deprivation of acquired citizenship has become a routine sanction. The Chair of the State Duma stated in August 2026 that more than 4,500 persons had lost acquired Russian nationality since the 2023 citizenship law had been passed and that 40 per cent of those decisions had been taken in the past year.[43]

76. Since 1 April 2025, children of foreign nationals have been required to pass a Russian-language test to enrol in school. In the 2025/26 school year, the federal education oversight agency reported that over 87 per cent of foreign children applicants had been excluded from education because they had either failed or had not been admitted to testing on technical grounds.[44]

IX. Human rights in Chechnya

77. Chechnya remains governed through fear, collective punishment and enforced "traditional" norms, sustained by a climate of impunity. Since mid-April 2026, Chechen security forces have conducted mass road raids affecting hundreds of people, inspecting vehicles and mobile telephones and detaining young men on minor pretexts; under threats of violence and criminal prosecution, some were coerced into signing military contracts to fight in Ukraine.

78. Pressure continued to be exerted on individuals through their relatives. In January 2026, Chechen security forces abducted four relatives of Khamzat Dadayev, who lives abroad, including his underage brother, reportedly threatening them with death or deployment to the war unless Mr. Dadayev returned to Chechnya; only when the case attracted public attention were they allowed to return home.

79. Women and girls fleeing domestic violence, forced marriage or the threat of an "honour" killing are tracked across the Russian Federation and abroad, deprived of documents and forcibly returned. Civil society has documented more than 30 such cross-border cases since 2022, and in 2026, organizations assisting women recorded a rise in requests for help to almost 40 a month. In October 2025, Aishat Baimuradova, who had fled domestic violence in Chechnya and relocated to Armenia, was found murdered in Yerevan; the Armenian authorities identified two Russian nationals who had fled to the Russian Federation. In October 2025, Aliya Ozdamirova fled fearing an "honour" killing, but in November, she was allegedly returned to Chechnya after a relative located her in Georgia; her death was confirmed within days.

80. Women human rights defenders assisting women fleeing violence are also targeted. In October 2025, a staff member of Stichting Justice Initiative in Moscow was questioned in connection with a woman who had fled Dagestan, and the staff member was subsequently surveilled and threatened, prompting her exile from the Russian Federation.[45] Lidia Mikhalchenko, the exiled founder of the "Caucasus without Mother" project assisting women separated from their children due to tradition, was subjected to a coordinated online attack and to death threats in connection with her work; in August 2026, she reported further threats against her project staff.

X. Reprisals for cooperation with the United Nations

81. In December 2025, Daria Egereva, a Selkup human rights defender and Co-Chair of the International Indigenous Peoples' Forum on Climate Change, was detained after returning from the thirtieth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations

[43] See https://max.ru/vv_volodin/AZ_vMR5IB4E.

[44] See https://obrnadzor.gov.ru/news/bolee-87-nesovershennoletnih-inostrannyh-grazhdan-pretenduyushhih-na-obuchenie-v-rossijskih-shkolah-ne-mogut-byt-zachisleny.

[45] Submission from Stichting Justice Initiative.

Framework Convention on Climate Change and faces up to 20 years' imprisonment, in an apparent reprisal for her engagement with United Nations mechanisms.[46] The same coordinated operation against former members of the Aborigen Forum also targeted Shor Indigenous rights defender Aleksei Chispiyakov, who had addressed the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in April 2025.

XI. Conclusions and recommendations

82. **Repression in the Russian Federation has become institutionalized and militarized in its mechanisms and effects. Measures built since February 2022 are embedded in criminal law, education, digital infrastructure, the penitentiary system, the war economy and official ideology. The "foreign agent", "undesirable organization" and "extremist" frameworks have evolved into systemic instruments of stigmatization and repression, imposing increasingly severe criminal, financial and civic restrictions on individuals and organizations for exercising fundamental freedoms. These and other measures, taken together, reflect an increasingly comprehensive system of social and political control that restricts civic space, suppresses dissent and undermines the effective enjoyment of freedom of expression, association, assembly and religion, academic freedom and access to information. The preservation of authoritarian power depends on the construction of internal and external enemies: repression at home dismantled the constraints on aggression abroad, while the war against Ukraine now justifies deeper repression, expropriation and impunity.**

83. **Militarization serves both the war and the preservation of authoritarian rule, demanding conformity, resources and lives while suppressing those who resist or expose its consequences. That system has a gendered and socioeconomic architecture. Men, particularly from economically deprived regions, households and ethnic minorities, are treated as expendable combatants and recruited through poverty, coercion and prisons; women are placed under the pressure of official "traditional values" and assigned responsibility for bearing and raising the next generation of citizens and future soldiers while their autonomy and their right to protest are restricted; poorer regions and marginalized communities carry disproportionate casualties and social costs. LGBT persons are criminalized through an extremist identity, and children are pushed towards military recruitment and increasingly pursued through the criminal courts. These are structural features of a State organized for war. It also increasingly spills over beyond the border of the Russian Federation, in the form of transnational repression as well as increased recruitment of foreign nationals to fight in the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, including through trafficking in persons and the exploitation of poverty in other countries.**

84. **Torture is widespread and systematic and forms part of the strategy of the authorities. Impunity connects torture and deaths in custody, gender-based killings, crimes by recruited offenders and returning combatants, and violations against Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war. Judicial and fair trial safeguards continued to significantly deteriorate, while the outlawing of the organizations, lawyers and networks that document or resist abuse closes the remaining avenues of solidarity and remedy.**

[46] See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30871.

A. Recommendations to the Russian Federation

85. **The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Russian authorities:**

(a) **Cooperate with the mandate, grant unhindered country access and implement previous recommendations;**

(b) **Repeal the "foreign agent", "undesirable organization" and war censorship frameworks; annul abusive designations and cease related prosecutions, and review and ensure compliance with international human rights standards of the counter-terrorism and anti-extremism frameworks;**

(c) **Align treason, espionage, terrorism and related national security laws with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality; end closed and politically motivated trials in absentia and restore full fair trial safeguards;**

(d) **Remove LGBT, Indigenous and other peaceful groups legitimately exercising their fundamental human rights from the "terrorist and extremist" registers;**

(e) **Immediately release all persons detained for the peaceful and legitimate exercise of their human rights; provide urgent medical care to gravely ill detainees and independently investigate every death in custody;**

(f) **Prevent and punish torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence; end incommunicado detention and unrecorded interrogation by security service officers, which render detainees vulnerable to torture and may amount to enforced disappearance; conduct prompt, independent and effective investigations into all deaths, violence, including sexual violence, and other abuse in custody, and hold those responsible to account; restore independent detention monitoring; provide survivor-centred rehabilitation and reparation;**

(g) **Release arbitrarily detained Ukrainian civilians, including children, account for disappeared persons and grant independent international access to all places of detention;**

(h) **End discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation or gender identity and adopt comprehensive domestic-violence legislation and effective protection measures; restore reproductive autonomy;**

(i) **End trafficking and coercive recruitment, guarantee conscientious objection and genuinely civilian alternative service, close unofficial military detention sites and abolish the extinction of criminal liability through military contracts;**

(j) **Comprehensively review all school curricula ensuring that the content of education is purely civilian and free from any military components and politicization; end ideological and digital surveillance of children and remove all politically motivated designations of children from the terrorist and extremist registers;**

(k) **Ensure fair trial guarantees in law and practice and guarantee the independence, confidentiality and self-governance of lawyers; end prosecutions, surveillance, travel restrictions and disbarment linked to legitimate professional work;**

(l) **End reprisals against persons cooperating with the United Nations, release Daria Egereva and other detained Indigenous defenders and ensure safe engagement with international mechanisms;**

(m) **In Chechnya, investigate disappearances and gender-based killings, prevent abduction and forced return, release persons held on politically motivated charges and ensure the protection from harassment or retaliation of relatives of persons perceived as critics of Chechen and federal authorities;**

(n) **Immediately cease all acts of transnational repression, including the sentencing of individuals in absentia, the placement of individuals on "terrorist and extremist" registers and the issuance of international arrest warrants for the peaceful and legitimate exercise of human rights, and refrain from seeking extraditions, expulsions or returns on such grounds;**

(o) **End arbitrary expropriation and the use of businesses for surveillance, censorship, recruitment and militarization; provide restitution and effective remedies consistent with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.**

B. Recommendations to the international community

86. **The Special Rapporteur recommends that the international community:**

(a) **Maintain scrutiny of the human rights situation and preserve evidence to standards suited for future accountability processes;**

(b) **Pursue accountability for the crime of aggression and for international crimes against Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war, including conflict-related sexual violence;**

(c) **Protect human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, anti-war activists, conscientious objectors and deserters from transnational repression and refoulement; reject politically motivated extradition, International Criminal Police Organization and mutual legal assistance requests; ensure that banks and compliance-database providers do not give automatic effect to Russian designations without vetting;**

(d) **Continue to use diplomatic pressure, including targeted sanctions, in response to human rights violations by Russian officials.**