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Avdonin Mikhail Ruslanovich

Михаил Авдонин

Article of the Criminal Code:

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Avdonin Mikhail Ruslanovich

Date of birth: January 2, 2005 (21 years old)
citizenship: Россия
Form of repression:  deprivation of liberty
Pursuit stage:  решение суда вступило в силу
Sentence:  14 лет лишения свободы в колонии строгого режима, из них 3 года в тюрьме
Date of sentencing:  November 5, 2024
Current location:  Prison No. 2, Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for Lipetsk Oblast

Avdonin Mikhail Ruslanovich was born on January 2, 2005, resident of Arkhangelsk. He completed secondary school. He is charged under Part 3 of Article 30 and Part 1 of Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“Attempted commission of a terrorist act,” punishable by up to 15 years of imprisonment). He has been in custody since September 23, 2023.

Inclusion of individuals in the list of persons subjected to criminal prosecution, in which there is a high likelihood of political motivation and serious violations of the law, does not imply their recognition as political prisoners.

Full description

According to the investigation, on the evening of September 23, 2023, Mikhail Avdonin arrived at the military settlement of military unit No. 21514 in the Isakogorsky District near Arkhangelsk with the intention of setting fire to a weapons depot building, but he was detained by local officers of the FSB and the Center for Countering Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. During the arrest, gasoline, motor oil, and ignition materials were found in Avdonin’s possession.

After his detention, Avdonin’s home was searched, and his computer’s system unit was seized. Investigators claim that Avdonin acted “on instructions from representatives of Ukrainian organizations opposing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” Other sources specify that, according to the investigation, Avdonin acted on instructions from the “Freedom of Russia Legion.” A criminal case for attempted terrorist attack (Part 3 of Article 30, Part 1 of Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code) was opened against him.

The arrest, the preceding surveillance of Avdonin, and his subsequent “repentance” are described in detail in a report by the media outlet 29.RU. According to this report, law enforcement agencies monitored Avdonin in advance — how he purchased a fuel canister, gloves, and other items, and how he walked toward the location of the alleged offense. Officers were waiting for him at the site, where he was detained. The report quotes Avdonin’s explanation that he agreed to carry out the arson for money, and that his interaction with his handler proceeded as follows: “I send him a video, he checks it, watches it, and then sends me the money.” Avdonin also stated that he did not intend to leave the Russian Federation after the act and that his parents did not know about his plans.

The material also includes a video of Avdonin’s “repentance,” in which he reads the following statement: “In April 2023, I established contact with representatives of Ukrainian nationalist armed formations. On September 23, 2023, on instructions from the curator of these radical structures, in exchange for the promised remuneration, I attempted to commit a terrorist act at a military facility in the Arkhangelsk Region. While I was on the territory of the military facility and preparing to carry out the terrorist act, my unlawful actions were stopped by officers of the regional branch of the FSB of Russia for the Arkhangelsk Region. I fully admit my guilt and repent. I now condemn the activities of these organizations.” Based on the speed of speech and characteristic pauses, Avdonin appears to be reading this statement from a sheet of paper.

Avdonin was placed in pre-trial detention on September 25, 2023, by Judge Anton Vitalievich Strelkov of the Lomonosovsky District Court of Arkhangelsk.

The motive for Avdonin’s actions is described in the media (for example, here and here) as a desire to earn money. In an interview from the pre-trial detention center, Avdonin says that an “unidentified person” contacted him online and offered to set fire to several “old torn automobile tires,” promising him 30,000 rubles for doing so. According to Avdonin, the territory of the military unit where the arson was supposed to take place “has in fact been abandoned for decades” and “is just a cluttered wasteland surrounded by an old, partly collapsing fence.” “So when I went there with the canister, I couldn’t even imagine that this facility was still on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (I didn’t think about that) or that my actions could harm anyone. I didn’t think about why they needed to hire me to burn tires,” Avdonin concludes.

According to the media outlet Astra, citing its own sources, on December 12, 2023, a second criminal case was opened against Avdonin — for preparation to commit high treason (Part 1 of Article 30, Article 275 of the Russian Criminal Code). However, this information does not correspond to the data published on the official website of the court where appeals against extensions of pre-trial detention were heard.

Avdonin now denies his guilt in both the attempted terrorist attack and the preparation for high treason, explaining: “I did not have any intent to betray my country or to commit a terrorist act. I believe that if the local FSB officers had not had an overwhelming desire to catch a ‘terrorist,’ my actions would have been classified as attempted arson [apparently referring to Part 3 of Article 30, Part 2 of Article 167 of the Criminal Code], which likely would have resulted in a minor suspended sentence.”

The criminal case against Avdonin was repeatedly reclassified: according to information about appeals related to his detention published on the court’s website, in October and November 2023 the charge was listed as attempted assistance to terrorist activity (Part 3 of Article 30, Part 1 of Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code). Then, in January 2024, it was listed as attempted terrorist act (Part 3 of Article 30, Part 1 of Article 205). In May 2024, documents concerning the extension of his detention cited Article 205, Part 2, points (a) and (v) — a terrorist act committed by a group of persons by prior conspiracy or an organized group, resulting in significant property damage or other grave consequences (four representatives of the victim were present at the hearing). In July 2024, the charge again reverted to attempted terrorist act (Part 3 of Article 30, Part 1 of Article 205).

On December 20, 2023, Mikhail Avdonin was added to Rosfinmonitoring’s list of terrorists and extremists, with a note indicating affiliation with terrorists.

Signs of political motivation and unlawfulness of deprivation of liberty

According to the latest information regarding the appeal of his detention dated July 31, 2024, Avdonin is currently charged only with attempted commission of a terrorist act (Part 3 of Article 30, Part 1 of Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code).

Information about the high treason charges is based primarily on Avdonin’s own interview and refers to the period of early March 2024, when he still had a state-appointed lawyer. The media outlet Astra also reported on the treason accusation in December 2023, citing anonymous sources. We consider the official information from judicial authorities to be the most reliable, and in our further analysis we examine only the charges against Avdonin for attempted commission of a terrorist act (Part 3 of Article 30, Part 1 of Article 205 of the Criminal Code).

Incorrect legal classification of the case

Mikhail Avdonin does not deny that he indeed intended to set fire to tires at the specified location on the instructions of an unknown person who contacted him online and offered him 30,000 rubles. Thus, the fact of attempted arson itself is not disputed.

Serious doubts arise regarding the claim that it was representatives of the “Freedom of Russia Legion” who actually contacted him and instructed him to carry out the arson. Below, we analyze the high likelihood of a security-service provocation, but even aside from that, the legal classification of Avdonin’s actions appears incorrect.

According to Avdonin, his only intention and motive was to earn money. He considered the area where the arson was to be carried out to be abandoned and, as he says, did not expect “that this facility was still on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (I didn’t think about that) or that my actions could cause harm to anyone.” In hindsight, he remarks on his own lack of foresight: “I did not think about why they needed to hire me to burn tires.”

If this is true, Avdonin’s actions cannot be classified as an attempted terrorist act, because such a qualification requires that the perpetrator’s intent be directed toward intimidating the population, creating a danger to human life, causing significant property damage or other grave consequences, destabilizing the work of state authorities, or influencing their decision-making. None of this reflects Avdonin’s intent; moreover, he not only did not desire such consequences—he did not even anticipate them. As he notes, he believed the area to be abandoned and deserted.

The incorrect legal classification stems not only from Avdonin’s intent but also from the location of the alleged arson. Had the arson taken place in an area that was, as the defendant believed, not in active use and where no people were present, it would not have led to intimidation of the population or destabilization of government functioning.

Finally, it is important to consider the potential public danger and the broader context of the actions attributed to Avdonin. As noted above, the planned arson was to occur in a deserted area and was aimed not at people but at property. If the objects involved were old tires, as Avdonin claims, the level of danger posed by the act is simply low. And if, as the investigation asserts, the intended target was an ammunition warehouse, then Avdonin’s actions take on certain characteristics of being socially beneficial.

On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation launched an act of aggression against Ukraine. On March 2, 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution stating that Russia’s war against Ukraine violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and constitutes the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state—that is, aggression. The resolution demands that the Russian Federation immediately cease the use of force against Ukraine and withdraw all its armed forces from Ukrainian territory within its internationally recognized borders.

In these circumstances, an arson attack on an ammunition warehouse is objectively aimed at reducing Russia’s offensive capability in this war and therefore indirectly counters the aggression. It should be emphasized that in reality—regardless of the legal qualification—Avdonin’s actions did not result in any damage whatsoever.

Thus, in any case, classifying Avdonin’s actions as an attempted terrorist act is incorrect. The question of whether he should be held liable under other articles of the Criminal Code (for example, Article 167 — intentional destruction or damage to property) or the Administrative Code (for example, Article 7.17 — destruction or damage to property) must be considered separately. Without access to the criminal case materials, we cannot determine this with certainty.

Signs of Fabrication of the Criminal Case

In the case of Mikhail Avdonin — as in the cases of Valeria Zotova and Mikhail Balabanov — there are serious doubts that the person who contacted him online was in fact a “handler” from Ukraine. There are grounds to believe that the correspondence was conducted by a provocateur from the Russian security services with the aim of creating yet another criminal case for an attempted terrorist act allegedly “on instructions from Ukraine.” Indicating this, in particular, is the security services’ high level of awareness about his plans, which allowed them to track his movements in full and to wait for him on a dark evening in a deserted location where the “crime” was supposedly meant to take place.

It is also noteworthy that in the video Avdonin is clearly reading a pre-written “confessional” text.

The difference between Avdonin’s case and the cases of Zotova and Balabanov is that media reports contain no indication of Avdonin’s position regarding Russia’s war against Ukraine. But even if he did not express any anti-war views, this does not in any way exclude the possibility that he was subjected to a provocation.

Operational provocation — long used widely and effectively to fabricate drug-related cases — has now been adopted by those fighting “terrorism” and “extremism.” It poses a serious threat to anti-war and opposition-minded citizens and, if it occurred here, also to very young people simply looking for a quick and relatively easy way to earn money.

The mechanical qualification of arson attacks on military enlistment offices and other military or administrative facilities under Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code has become common practice. This qualification appears politically motivated and is aimed, on the one hand, at intimidating society with disproportionately harsh punishment, and on the other, at creating and reinforcing the idea that Ukraine is carrying out terrorist attacks in Russia. This narrative further serves to justify Russia’s criminal war and creates an atmosphere of heightened anxiety that is convenient for the constant expansion of the powers of Russian security agencies inside the country.

It should be noted that at least until 30 January 2024 Avdonin had only state-appointed lawyers, whose work he found unsatisfactory: “No, I don’t have a retained lawyer, and the court-appointed one doesn’t want to work — ‘think for yourself’ is his answer to any question about the case.” According to Avdonin’s mother, the court-appointed lawyer tricked Mikhail into admitting guilt in allegedly setting fire to “some bathhouses on the territory of a military base,” telling him that if he signed this, “his sentence would be reduced.” This episode is supported by the fact that in May 2024 the charges were reclassified under Article 205(2)(a),(v) of the Criminal Code — a terrorist act committed by a group of persons by prior conspiracy or an organized group and causing significant property damage or other grave consequences. It was at that moment that a victim or victims appeared in the case. After a retained lawyer entered the proceedings, the charges were reclassified back to attempted terrorist act (Article 30(3), Article 205(1) of the Criminal Code).

Overall, the repeated reclassification of the charges against Avdonin, described above, in our view strongly suggests manipulation of the case and a high likelihood of its fabrication.

Violation of the Detainee’s Rights

Finally, attention should be drawn to the likely violations of Mikhail Avdonin’s right not to be subjected to cruel treatment, guaranteed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and his right to receive qualified legal assistance, guaranteed by Article 48 of the Russian Constitution.

According to media reports, Avdonin was severely beaten at the moment of his arrest and then forced to remain in a specific position for an extended period, which can be regarded as torture:
“The arrest was unreasonably violent. Plainclothes men (who, as it turned out later, were regional FSB officers), without identifying themselves or presenting any documents, attacked me. They beat me with their fists and used a stun gun on me until I lost consciousness and fell. After that they brought me round, handcuffed my arms behind my back, and forced me to kneel on the cold ground. They kept me in this position for at least two hours, not allowing me to move. When the district police officer arrived to formalize my arrest, I was unable to stand up on my own.”

Thus, the criminal prosecution and deprivation of liberty were very likely applied to Mikhail Avdonin in the absence of a criminal offense and in violation of his rights guaranteed by several national and international norms.

As we lack reliable information about all the circumstances of the case, we cannot at this time assess whether Avdonin’s deprivation of liberty meets the criteria for recognition as a political prisoner. If such information becomes available, we intend to evaluate it.

The independent human rights project Support for Political Prisoners. Memorial, which continues the work of the former Political Prisoners Support Program of the Human Rights Center “Memorial,” finds — in accordance with the international guidelines on the definition of a political prisoner — that the criminal case against Mikhail Avdonin shows signs of political motivation and fabrication and was very likely created by state actors with the aim of strengthening state power and intimidating society as a whole. His criminal prosecution and deprivation of liberty were very likely applied in violation of his right to a fair trial and other rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Russian Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The independent human rights project Support for Political Prisoners. Memorial demands a review of the criminal case against Mikhail Avdonin.

Inclusion of individuals in the list of persons subjected to criminal prosecution, where there are strong indications of political motivation and serious violations of the law, does not mean that they are recognized as political prisoners.

Date of the profile update: 29 November 2024.